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TEXT OF STATUTES 
U.C.A. §76-2-302. Compulsion: 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense 
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct 
because he was coerced to do so by the use 
or threatened imminent use of unlawful 
physical force upon him or a third person, 
which force or threatened force a person of 
reasonable firmness in his situation would 
not have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by 
this section shall be unavailable to a 
person who intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly places himself in a situation in 
which it is probable that he will be 
subject to duress. 
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by 
reason of the presence of her husband, to 
any presumption of compulsion or to any 
defense of compulsion except as in 
subsection (1) provided. 
U.C.A. §76-2-401: 
Conduct which i s j u s t i f i e d i s a defense to 
p r o s e c u t i o n for any offense based on the 
conduct . The defense of j u s t i f i c a t i o n may 
be c la imed: 
(5) When the a c t o r ' s conduct i s j u s t i f i e d 
for any o ther reason under the laws of t h i s 
s t a t e . 
U.C.A. §41 -6 -44 .10 (6 ) : 
(a)The person to be tested may, at his own 
expense, have a physician of his own choice 
administer a chemical test in addition to 
the test or tests administered at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(b)The failure or inability to obtain the 
additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or 
tests taken at the direction of a peace 
officer, or preclude or delay these test or 
tests to be taken at the direction of a 
peace officer. 
(c)The additional test shall be subsequent 
to the test or tests administered at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
17-A M.R.S.A. §103(1) : 
Conduct which the actor believes to be 
necessary to avoid imminent physical harm 
to himself or another is justifiable if the 
desirability and urgency of avoiding such 
harm outweigh, according to ordinary 
standards of reasonableness, the harm 
sought to be prevented by the statute 
defining the crime charged. 
The trial court erred when it 'refused to 
give the instruction because he determined, 
as a matter of law, that a defendant who 
denies that he committed the crime cannot 
also assert the inconsistent defense that 
he did commit the crime because he 
"believe [d] it to be necessary to avoid 
imminent physical harm to himself or 
another,"1 495 A.2d at 338 (citations 
omitted) . 
Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing 
provisions of this article defining 
justifiable use of physical force, conduct 
which would otherwise constitute an 
offense is justifiable and not criminal 
when: 
2. Such conduct is necessary as an 
emergency measure to avoid an imminent 
public or private situation occasioned or 
developed through no fault of the actor, 
and which is of such gravity that, 
according to ordinary standard of 
intelligence and morality, the desirability 
and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly 
outweigh the desirability of avoiding the 
injury sought to be prevented by the 
statute defining the offense in issue. The 
necessity and justifiability of such 
conduct may not rest upon considerations 
pertaining only to the morality and 
advisability of the statute, either in its 
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general application or with respect to its 
application to a particular class of cases 
arising thereunder. Whenever evidence 
relating to the defense of justification 
under this subdivision is offered by the 
defendant, the court shall rule as a matter 
of law whether the claimed facts and 
circumstances would, if established, 
constitute a defense. 
Salt Lake City Traffic Code §084: 
No driver of a vehicle shall disobey the 
instructions of any traffic control device 
placed in accordance with the provisions of 
this title, unless at the time he is 
otherwise directed by a police officer, or 
subject to the exceptions granted the 
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle 
in this title. 
Salt Lake City Traffic Code §105: 
1. It is unlawful and punishable as 
provided in this section for any person to 
operate or be in actual physical control of 
a vehicle within this city if the person 
has a blood or breath alcohol content of 
.08 percent by weight as shown by a 
chemical test given within two hours after 
the alleged operation or physical control, 
or if the person under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol or any drug to a 
degree which renders the person incapable 
of safely driving a vehicle within this 
city. 
2. The fact that a person charged with 
violating this section is or has been 
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug 
does not constitute a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
Salt Lake City Traffic Code §109: 
A. No person shall drink any alcohol 
beverage while driving a motor vehicle or 
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while a passenger in a motor vehicle, 
whether the vehicle is moving, stopped, or 
parked on any street or highway. 
B. No person shall keep, carry, possess, 
transport, or allow another to keep, carry, 
possess or transport in the passenger 
compartment of a motor vehicle, when the 
vehicle is on any public street or highway, 
any container whatsoever which contains any 
alcoholic beverage, if the container has 
been opened, the seal thereon broken, or 
the contents of the container partially 
consumed. 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
"No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or 
imunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of laws." 
Article 1, Section 7, the Constitution of Utah: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law." 
Model Penal Code, General Provision and Commentaries: 
Section 3.02. Justification Generally: 
Choice of Evils. 
(l)Conduct that the actor believes to be 
necessary to avoid a harm or evil to 
himself or to another is justifiable, 
provided that: 
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(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided 
by such conduct is greater than that sought 
to be prevented by the law defining the 
offense charged; and 
(b) neither the Code nor other law 
defining the offense provides exceptions or 
defenses dealing with the specific 
situation involved; and 
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the 
justification claimed does not otherwise 
plainly appear. 
(2)When the actor was reckless or negligent 
in bringing about the situation requiring a 
choice of harms or evils or in appraising 
the necessity for his conduct, the 
justification afforded by this Section is 
unavailable in a prosecution for any 
offense for which reckless or negligence, 
as the case may be, suffices to establish 
culpability. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n d e n y i n g 
d e f e n d a n t ' s mot ion t o s u p p r e s s the r e s u l t s 
of the i n t o x i l y z e r b r e a t h t e s t , g rounded 
upon the Due P r o c e s s Clause of the 
F o u r t e e n t h Amendment t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s 
C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t i c l e I , §7 of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n of U t a h . 
Did the c o u r t e r r i n d e n y i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s 
r e q u e s t e d j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n , on 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o U.C.A. § 7 6 - 2 - 4 0 1 / 
a f t e r the d e f e n d a n t p roduced e v i d e n c e which 
p r o v i d e d the f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r such a 
d e f e n s e . 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-26 (2) (a) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a criminal 
action may take an appeal to the Utah court of Appeals from a final 
judgment of conviction of a Class B Misdemeanor by a Circuit Court. 
In the case at hand, final judgment and conviction were rendered by 
the Honorable Judge Paul G. Grant, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake 
Department, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
- x -
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
v . 
JON B. BUXTON, 
De fe n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 880401-CA 
Priority #2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of the 
Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for Count I, 
Driving Under the Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Section 105 of the Salt Lake City Traffic Code (1984); Count II, 
Obedience To Semiphore At Crosswalk, an infraction, in violation of 
Section 084 of the Salt Lake City Traffic Code (1984); and Count 
III, Open Container In Vehicle, an infraction, in violation of 
Section 109 of the Salt Lake City Traffic Code (1984). The 
defendant/appellant, represented by his attorney of record, CHARLES 
F. LOYD, JR., was found guilty through a jury trial. The court 
sentenced the defendant on Count I to 180 days jail and $1100.00 
fines and fees, with 170 days jail suspended upon twelve months 
probation to the court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 13, 1988, the defendant/appellant, JON B. 
BUXTON, with his passenger Glen Thomas, drove to the residence of 
Alan Goodrich at 3030 South West Temple in South Salt Lake City. A 
barbeque was planned and they began fixing dinner. Thomas became 
ill with what appeared to be a recurrence of heart trouble. At 
about 8:00 p.m. medical attention was deemed necessary, but there 
was no telephone in the house nor immediately nearby. It was 
decided that Buxton would drive Thomas to the hospital as Goodrich 
was caring for several young children. 
While driving northbound on State Street Buxton was stopped 
at 575 South State Street by Officer Kirk of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department for speeding and running a red light at 600 
South. After Kirk advised Buxton of the reason for the traffic 
stop, Buxton explained that Thomas was ill and needed medical 
attention. An ambulance was summoned and did transport Thomas to 
the Veterans Administration Hospital, where he spent the next three 
days. 
During conversation with Buxton, Kirk noticed an odor of 
alcohol on Buxton's breath. Kirk conducted field sobriety tests and 
arrested Buxton for drunk driving. At the Metropolitan Hall of 
Justice, using the standard DUI Report Form (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5), 
Kirk advised Buxton that he was under arrest and requested that 
Buxton submit to a breath test. Buxton consented to taking a breath 
test, the result of which was .202. 
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ARGUMENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE I 
DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS OF THE 
INTOXILYZER BREATH TEST, GROUNDED UPON THE 
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND ARTICLE I, §7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH. 
SUMMARY 
Defendant argues that under the procedure established by 
the DUI Report Form (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5), an arrested individual 
who physically refuses to submit to a chemical test is read an 
admonition which informs him that he is permitted to have an 
additional chemical test administered by a physician of his own 
choice. The right to an additional chemical test is statutory, 
U.C.A. §41-6-44.10(6) (1953 as amended). An arrested individual who 
readily agrees to the police officer's request to submit to a 
chemical test, however, is not informed of his right to an 
additional chemical test, under the procedure established by the DUI 
Report Form. The result is that arrested individuals who 
immediately consent to take a chemical test administered by a police 
officer are not informed of their right to an additional chemical 
test and thus are accorded less statutory protection than those 
arrested individuals who initially refuse to submit to a chemical 
test. The inequitable result is unfair to cooperative individuals 
and is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, §7 of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
Officer Kirk testified that he followed the procedure of 
the DUI Report Form, in Section X, Chemical Tests, and that Buxton 
consented to take a breath test after he was read the section 
concerning the Utah implied Consent Law. (Transcript p. 27). Kirk 
did not read Buxton the admonition that followed concerning 
additional chemical tests, (p. 32)(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 5). 
Officer Cheever, who actually operated the Intoxilyzer 4011ASA 
breath test machine, also testified he did not inform Buxton of the 
admonition which provides notice of the right to an additional 
chemical test. (p. 47-8). Kirk testified that where an arrested 
individual refuses the test he does read them the admonition. 
(p. 104). 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, 
however I must warn you that if you refuse, your 
license or permit to drive a motor vehicle may be 
revoked for one year with no provision for a limited 
driver's license. After you have taken this test, 
you will be permitted to have a physician of your 
own choice administer a test at your own expense, in 
addition to the one I have requested you to submit 
to, so long as it does not delay the test or tests 
requested by me. Upon your request, I will make 
available to you the results of the test if you take 
it. (emphasis added) 
ARGUMENT 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
determines what procedural process is necessary if the government 
deprives an individual of life, liberty or property. The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution requires that similarly situated individuals be treated 
similarly by the government. Procedural Due Process deals with the 
-4 -
adjudication of the individual claims, while Equal Protection deals 
with legislative classification. The two concepts are sometimes 
interchangable, however, and it is a well settled rule that the 
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause encompasses equal protection 
principles. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 106 S.Ct. 2727, 91 
L.Ed.2d 527 n.2 (1986); Matthews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 97 
S.Ct. 431, 50 L.Ed.2d 389 n.l (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 
749, 95 S.Ct 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884, (1954). 
In Utah, under U.C.A. 41-6-44.10(6) (1953 as amended), an 
individual is accorded a statutory right to an additional chemical 
test following an arrest for Driving Under the influence if he has 
submitted to the test administered at the police officer's request. 
(a)The person to be tested may, at his own 
expense, have a physician of his own choice 
administer a chemical test in addition to 
the test or tests administered at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(b)The failure or inability to obtain the 
additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or 
tests taken at the direction of a peace 
officer, or preclude or delay these test or 
tests to be taken at the direction of a 
peace officer. 
(c)The additional test shall be subsequent 
to the test or tests administered at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
The statute does not require that the individual be notified by the 
police officer of his right to the additional chemical test. The 
DUI report form used by the Salt Lake City Police Department, 
however, does provide notice of the right to an additional test to 
those individuals who initially refuse to take the test requested by 
the officer. Following the initial refusal, the officer reads the 
first admonition, which informs the individual of the right to an 
additional chemical test. The individual may then agree to take the 
test requested by the officer, and subsequently request the 
opportunity to have an additional test administered by a physician 
of his own choice . 
Because some individuals are advised of the right to an 
additional chemical test, all individuals should be so informed. 
There is no legal basis for procedurally discriminating between 
those individuals who readily comply with the officer's request to 
take a chemical test, those who refuse,and those who first refuse 
and then comply. The procedure as implemented by the DUI report 
form in fact penalizes the cooperative individuals. 
There is discrimination and unfairness in the application 
of the statute to individual cases which violates procedural due 
process. Process, in this case the notice of the availability of an 
additional chemical test, is furnished to those individuals who 
initially refuse to take the chemical test. We are not talking 
about process that could or should be furnished, we are talking 
about process that is actually furnished to some individuals. And 
inherent in the concept of due process is fairness, a requirement 
that each individual be accorded the same range of rights as all 
others in the same situation. 
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Several jurisdictions have held that a motorist charged 
with an alcohol driving offense does not have right, absent specific 
statutory language to the contrary, to notice of a statutory right 
to an independent chemical test. See Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106 
(Alaska 1979); Farmington v. Joseph, 575 P.2d 104 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1978). In neither case, however, nor in any case from another 
jurisdiction, were some individuals notified of the right to an 
independent chemical test and other individuals not notified. The 
present case is distinguishable: some are notified and some are 
not, and due process is violated because those who readily consent 
are not notified. 
The remedy for failing to notify an individual of the right 
to an independent chemical test is dismissal, People v. Koval, 124 
N.W.2d 274 (Mich. 1963), or exclusion of the chemical test evidence 
obtained by the police officer, State v. Creson, 576 P.2d 814 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1978). See generally 45 ALR4th 1. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE II 
DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING DEPENDANT'S 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION, ON 
JUSTIFICATION PURSUANT TO U.C.A. §76-2-401, 
AFTER THE DEFENDANT PRODUCED EVIDENCE WHICH 
PROVIDED THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR SUCH A 
DEFENSE. 
SUMMARY 
Defendant argues that U.C.A. §76-2-401 (5)(1953 as amended) 
should be read to include the defense of necessity or, in the 
alternative, that U.C.A. §76-2-302(1)(1953 as amended) should be 
enlarged to include any forces which coerce a person to engage in 
proscribed conduct. The defense of necessity promulgated in the 
Model Penal Code is logically consistent with Utah's compulsion 
defense, and rationality and justice demand its inclusion in Utah 
criminal law. A person who breaks the law to avoid a greater harm 
caused by an outside agency is no different from a person who breaks 
the law to avoid a threat of physical harm caused by another 
person. To deny an affirmative defense to the first person is 
unfair and serves no purpose under the criminal law. 
Jon Buxton testified he was driving Glen Thomas to the 
hospital when stopped on State Street by Officer Kirk. (p. 97). 
Shortly before, at the residence of Allen Goodrich, Thomas began 
experiencing chest pains, shoulder pains, painful spasms, and 
shortness of breath, to such an extent that is appeared he was 
having a heart attack. (p. 82, 88, 95). Goodrich, who does not 
have a phone at his residence and testified there were no phones 
nearby, insisted Buxton take Thomas to the hospital right away. 
(p. 89). Buxton thought it was a life threatening situation. 
(p. 97). After the traffic stop Thomas was taken by ambulance to 
the Veteran's Administration Hospital where he spent three days. 
Based on the facts introduced or offered into evidence, 
defendant requested an instruction from the Model Penal Code on the 
defense of necessity: 
Conduct which is justified as a defense to 
prosecution for any offense based on the 
conduct: Conduct which the actor believes 
to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to 
himself or another is justifiable provided 
that the harm of evil sought to be avoided 
by such conduct is greater than that sought 
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to be prevented by the law defining the 
offense charged. Therefore, if the 
defendant proves to your satisfaction the 
above elements or justification did exist 
and the prosecution does not negate the 
defense of justification beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to 
return a verdict of not guilty." (p. 109). 
The defense cited to justification, U.C.A. §76-2-401, 
compulsion, §76-2-302, State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981) and the Model Penal Code. 
The court refused the proferred instruction. (p. 109). 
ARGUMENT 
Two questions are posed by this issue. First, does U.C.A. 
§76-2-401(5) (1953 as amended) state the general principle of 
justification in terms that include the defense of necessity? The 
defense of necessity, also generally known as "choice of evils" or 
"competing harms", was available at common law, is recognized in the 
Model Penal Code, and is codified in a number of states and 
available through case law precedent in others. Second, if the 
affirmative defense of necessity is available under U.C.A. 
§76-2-401(5) (1953 as amended), is it available as a defense to 
Driving Under the Influence? The courts of several states have held 
that necessity is an affirmative defense to Driving Under the 
Influence, that the instruction may be submitted to the jury after 
evidence of an adequate factual basis is received. 
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U.C.A. §76-2-401(1953 as amended) p rov ides in p e r t i n e n t 
p a r t t h a t : 
Conduct which i s j u s t i f i e d i s a defense to 
p r o s e c u t i o n for any offense based on the 
conduct . The defense of j u s t i f i c a t i o n may 
be c la imed: 
(5) When the a c t o r ' s conduct i s j u s t i f i e d 
for any o the r reason under the laws of t h i s 
s t a t e . 
U.C.A. §76-2-302. Compulsion: 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense 
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct 
because he was coerced to do so by the use 
or threatened imminent use of unlawful 
physical force upon him or a third person, 
which force or threatened force a person of 
reasonable firmness in his situation would 
not have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by 
this section shall be unavailable to a 
person who intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly places himself in a situation in 
which it is probable that he will be 
subject to duress. 
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by 
reason of the presence of her husband, to 
any presumption of compulsion or to any 
defense of compulsion except as in 
subsection (1) provided. 
It is here argued that U.C. A. §76-2-401(5) states the general 
principle of justification under which the defense of necessity is 
included, and that the inclusion of the defense of necessity is 
consistent with the legislative intent of Utah's compulsion defense. 
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The defense of necessity was available at common law. See 
The William Gray, 29 F.Cas. 1300 (C.C.N.Y. 1810) (No. 17, 694); 
United States v. Ashton, 24 F.Cas. 873 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14, 
470); Rex v. Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687; W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., 
Substantive Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 627-640 (1986). 
The defense of necessity, or the choice of evils defense, 
is codified in the Model Penal Code, which served as a source for 
the Utah Criminal Code (1973 as amended). See American Law 
Institute, Model Penal Code, General Provisions, Part I, Article 3, 
Section 3.02 (1980); Model Penal Code, Commentaries, Part I, Article 
3, Section 3.02 (1980). Section 3.02 provides in pertinent part 
that: 
Section 3.02. Justification Generally: Choice of Evils. 
(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be 
necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or 
to another is justifiable, provided that: 
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided 
by such conduct is greater than that sought to be 
prevented by the law defining the offense 
charged; and 
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining 
the offense provides exceptions or defenses 
dealing with the specific situation involved; and 
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the 
justification claimed does not otherwise plainly 
appear. 
(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in 
bringing about the situation requiring a choice 
of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity 
for his conduct, the justification afforded by 
this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for 
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any offense for which reckless or negligence, as 
the case may be, suffices to establish 
culpability. 
As the Commentaries point out, this formulation of the principle of 
necessity is subject to a number of limitations. First, the actor 
must actually believe that his conduct is necessary to avoid an 
evil. Model Penal Code, Commentaries, Vol. 2, p. 11. Second, the 
necessity must arise from an attempt by the actor to avoid an evil 
or harm that is greater than the evil or harm sought to be avoided 
by the law defining the offense charged. Commentaries at p. 12. 
Third, the balancing of evils is not committed to the private 
judgment of the actor; it is an issue for determination at the 
trial IQ. Fourth, under subsections(1)(b) and (l)(c), the general 
choice evils defense cannot succeed if the issue of competing values 
has been previously foreclosed by a deliberate legislative choice, 
as when some provision of the law deals explicitly with the specific 
situation that presents the choice of evils or a legislative purpose 
to exclude the claimed justification otherwise appears. K3. at 13. 
And as is elsewhere made clear, justification is an affirmative 
defense, with the burden of production falling to the defendant and 
the burden of persuasion of the prosecution, ^d. at 6. The authors 
of the Model Penal Code write that such a formulation of the 
principle of necessity reflects the judgment that such a 
qualification on criminal liability, like the general requirements 
of culpability, is essential to the rationality and justice of the 
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criminal law, and is appropriately addressed in a Penal Code. 
Id. at 9. Finally, the Model Penal Code §2.09 is the source of 
Utah's compulsion defense, U.C.A. §76-2-302, the sole difference 
being the Model Penal Code §2.09(4) references to §3.02, the 
necessity defense. 
An alternate formulation of the principle of necessity, 
followed by a minority of states, is the New York Statute, N.Y. 
§35.05, which in pertinent part provides: 
Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing 
provisions of this article defining justifiable 
use of physical force, conduct which would 
otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable 
and not criminal when: 
2. Such conduct is necessary as an 
emergency measure to avoid an imminent public 
or private situation occasioned or developed 
through no fault of the actor, and which is of 
such gravity that, according to ordinary 
standard of intelligence and morality, the 
desirability and urgency of avoiding such 
injury clearly outweigh the desirability of 
avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by 
the statute defining the offense in issue. The 
necessity and justifiability of such conduct 
may not rest upon considerations pertaining 
only to the morality and advisability of the 
statute, either in its general application or 
with respect to its application to a particular 
class of cases arising thereunder. Whenever 
evidence relating to the defense of 
justification under this subdivision is offered 
by the defendant, the court shall rule as a 
matter of law whether the claimed facts and 
circumstances would, if established, constitute 
a defense . 
The New York law adds the requirements that the conduct be an 
"emergency measure to avoid an imminent" injury and that the 
necessity for action be occasioned or developed "through no fault 
the actor". Id. at 19, 20. 
Numerous states have made the defense of necessity 
statutory or available through case law. See generally American Law 
Institute Model Penal Code, Commentaries, Vol. 2, p. 18 (1980); 
W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, Vol. I, 
p. 627-640 (1986); State v. Jacobs, 371 So.2d 801 (La. 1979). 
There do not appear to be any Utah cases in which the 
specific defense of necessity has been considered. No annotations 
to O.C.A. §76-2-401(5) (1953 as amended) were located. Nevertheless, 
the defense of necessity should be read into U.C.A. §76-2-401(5) in 
the interest of justice. The necessity defense embodies the same 
theory found in the compulsion defense, U.C.A. §76-2-301(1), that a 
person should not be criminally liable for breaking the criminal law 
if in so doing the person avoids or prevents a greater harm from 
occurring, but in a situation created by natural forces or an 
outside agency, in the compulsion situation, the actor acts to 
avoid physical harm threatened by another person, and the defense is 
available so long as the actor does not place himself Ln the 
situation intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. Similarly, in 
the necessity situation the actor acts to avoid physical harm to 
himself or a third person threatened by natural forces or an outside 
agency, in each case the actor breaks the law to avoid a more 
harmful result, with the net benefit accruing to society. The 
policy supporting each defense is the utilitarian benefit the 
outcome provides society. Necessity and compulsion are closely 
related affirmative defenses, different only in that under the 
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n e c e s s i t y defense the ac to r i s coerced by a harm emanating from an 
ou ts ide agency or n a t u r a l f o r c e s . See Cleveland v. Munic ipa l i ty of 
Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981); People v. S t rock , 623 P.2d 
42 (Colo. 1981) . 
There is, additionally, a line of cases in Utah which 
suggest that the defense of necessity should be available to a 
criminal defendant. Beginning with the defendant's constitutional 
right to present all competent evidence in his defense, the courts 
have found that, when the defendant has presented sufficient 
evidence of an affirmative defense to entertain reasonable doubt, he 
is entitled to have an instruction on the law: 
[The] defendant's right to present all 
competent evidence in his defense is a 
right guaranteed by the due process clause 
of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7, 
as well as our Federal Constitution, 14th 
Amendment-. It is also axiomatic that where 
the defendant has asserted a defense to 
justify or excuse the criminal charge, and 
where there is reasonable basis in the 
evidence to support it, the viability of 
the defense then becomes a question of fact 
and the jury should be charged regarding 
it. Where, however, there is no reasonable 
basis in the evidence to support the 
defense or its essential components, it is 
not error for the trial judge to either 
refuse to instruct the jury as to the 
defense, or to instruct them to disregard 
it. 
State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981)(citations omitted). In 
State v. Harding the court considered whether the defense of 
compulsion, U.C. A. §76-2-302 (1953 as amended) was applicable to 
prison escape. The trial court refused to instruct the jury to 
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consider the defense, and the Supreme Court upheld the decision 
based on lack of evidence as to the elements of the defense. The 
court, however, did not preclude application of the statutory 
compulsion defense to the crime of escape. 
The case of State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986) is 
illustrative of the position which the common law and the Model 
Penal Code occupy in the Utah Criminal Code. In Tuttle, as in 
Harding, supra, the defendant requested a jury instruction on the 
compulsion defense under U.C. A. §76-2-302(1)(1953 as amended) on a 
charge of escape from official custody while incarcerated at the 
Utah State Prison. The trial court gave the instruction suggested 
by the prosecution, which qualified the statutory compulsion defense 
by including, in the escape context, additional elements found in 
the common law. Mindful that the legislature's intent in 
promulgating a new criminal code in 1973 was to abolish the common 
law of crimes, the Supreme Court said that the common law still 
offered interpretive assistance. The Utah Supreme court upheld the 
trial court's instruction, and because defendant failed to prevail 
on the defense at trial, upheld the conviction: 
[In] enacting the new criminal code, the 
legislature abolished the common law of 
crimes. Moreover because section 76-2-302 
is based on the Model Penal Code and not on 
the common law, it does not necessarily 
bring in its train all the baggage 
constituting the common law duress 
defense. The legislature's expressed 
intent to abandon the common law of crimes 
and replace it with the new code might 
suggest we should not resort to common law 
precedents that would have been pertinent 
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to interpretation of our pre-1973 criminal 
statutes when faced with a situation not covered 
by the current code. That argument is persuasive 
when the new criminal code differs substantially 
from the old statutorily enacted common law and 
the reason for the difference is discernible. 
However/ where the differences appear to be 
largely technical and we can discern no purpose 
for the diversion from the prior law, we should 
be free to refer to it for such interpretive 
assistance as it may offer. It would be foolish 
to ignore all the evolutionary experience 
represented by the common law simply because 
modern draftsmen have rewritten the old law in 
plainer language. 
Tuttle at 633 (citations omitted); See also Wells v. State/ 689 
P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). 
Whether the defense of necessity should be available to the 
criminal offense of driving under the influence is a separate 
question which should be answered in the affirmative. Several state 
courts have considered cases in which the facts supported or did not 
support the assertion of the defense of necessity. See generally 64 
ALR4th 298. 
In Vermont/ the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for new 
trial a case in which the trial court refused the defendant's 
request for an instruction of the necessity defense. State v. 
Shotten/ 458 A.2d 1105 (Vt. 1983). The facts are similar to the 
present case. The defendant was stopped and arrested for Driving 
Under the Influence. At the police station she informed the officer 
she was injured/ that she had been assaulted and pushed down a 
flight of stairs by her husband and was on her way to the hospital 
when stopped. She testified the telephone at her home was 
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disconnected so she could not use it to call for help, and she was 
unwilling to risk the short walk to her neighbor's homes and finding 
them empty. At the emergency room she was found to have multiple 
rib fractures which required a hospital stay of five days. 
The evidence presented at trial was 
sufficient to raise a question of fact for 
the jury as to whether the defendant drove 
because it was reasonably conceived by her 
to have been a necessity; accordingly, an 
instruction on the issue should have been 
given upon request . . . . [it] was the 
function of the jury to determine first 
whether defendant was driving while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor, and 
if she was, then to determine whether she 
was justified in doing so because of 
necessity. By refusing to charge the jury 
on the second issue, the trial court 
committed reversible error. I_d. at 1106, 
1107. 
In another case, however, the Supreme Court held that the 
failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the necessity 
defense was proper where the emergency had ceased prior to the 
defendant's driving under the influence. State v. Dapo, 470 A.2d 
1173 (Vt. 1973). 
Other jurisdictions have considered the necessity defense 
in the context of the crime of Driving Under the Influence. In 
Oregon, the trial court was reversed where there was sufficient 
evidence introduced to support the statutory choice of evils 
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defense. State v. Olson, 719 P.2d 55 (Or, 1986). In a case of 
first impression in California, the court held the necessity defense 
available to one charged with misdemeanor Driving Under the 
Influence. People v. Pena, 197 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1983). And in New 
Hampshire, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Driving While 
Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor where the elements of the 
statutory defense of competing harms were not established. State v. 
Fee, 489 A.2d 606 (N.H. 1985). 
I reviewing court held that the trial court 
improperly denied the defendant's request for a jury instruction on 
the statutory competing harms defense in a case 
of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor. State v. Knowles, 495 A.2d 335 (Me. 1985). 
17-A M.R.S.A. §103(1) provides in pertinent part: 
Conduct which the actor believes to be 
necessary to avoid imminent physical harm 
to himself or another is justifiable if the 
desirability and urgency of avoiding such 
harm outweigh, according to ordinary 
standards of reasonableness, the harm 
sought to be prevented by the statute 
defining the crime charged. 
The trial court erred when it: 
"refused to give the instruction because he 
determined, as a matter of law, that a 
defendant who denies that he committed the 
crime cannot also assert the inconsistent 
defense that he did commit the crime 
because he 'believe [d] it to be necessary 
to avoid imminent physical harm to himself 
or another, 495 A.2d at 338 (citations 
omitted) f " 
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The reviewing court said inconsistent defenses may be interposed in 
a criminal case, whatever the tactial wisdom, and that if the 
evidence was introduced for the competing harms defense then the 
defendant was entitled to an instruction on it. Ij3. at 339. 
CONCLUSION 
First, absent specific statutory language, an arrested 
person does not have a constitutional right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to be given notice of his statutory right to an additional 
chemical test, a majority of jurisdictions have held. The present 
case is different, even though the Utah Statute is silent as to 
notice, because police officers routinely give notice of the 
statutory additional chemical test to those arrested persons who 
initially refuse the officer's breath test. The government has 
created a situation where some arrested persons receive notice and 
others do not and therefore, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of 
Utah, the present procedure in unconstitutional. A constitutionally 
correct procedure would be that all arrested persons receive notice 
of their statutory right. The remedy for failing to provide notice 
must be suppression of evidence obtained from the officer's breath 
test or dismissal of the charges. 
Second, the common law defense of necessity, updated in the 
Model Penal Code, must be included in the Utah Criminal Code. The 
similarity of the necessity defense to Utah's compulsion defense is 
so great that no principled distinction between the two can be made. 
-20-
Further, absent specific legislative intent, the necessity defense 
should be available in the context of Driving Under the Influence. 
Defendant introduced or offered evidence of a prima facie factual 
basis for the instruction from the Model Penal Code, Failure of the 
court to instruct the jury on the necessity defense is reversible 
error and warrants a new trial for defendant. 
Respectfully submitted th is ZVi T^r day of March, 1989 . 
CHARLES/F. LOYD, JR 
A t t o r n e y f o r l l a n t 
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ADDENDUM A 
ADMONITION; NOTICE OF RIGHT TO ADDITIONAL CHEMICAL TEST 
* ; _ - ^ :—\ ^r ~ — r -» Y ^ ^ fa — ^ - ^ — ^ v -> v N I ^ - * \ • M U V : \ \\y ^ 
5. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ 
Were tests demonstrated by officer? " N ^ J J > Subject's ability to follow instructions \ C £ ^ 
SEARCHES 
A. Vehicle: 
Was subject's vehicle searched? \(trS> Where? J E _ _ _ b _ _ 
WhPn? * 2 \ ^ ^> ^Evidence C^PgN ^ — T \ ^ CS^ l X ^ V V . \ r v V ^ \ ^ ~ " 
Person who performed the search ^ v~r~ W V ^ v ? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
B. Subject: ^_ 
Was subject's person sea rched 'H*^ * Where? * r :^ : :r">) ^ S o ^ " v r ^ v — 
When? ~ . l ° ^ _ _ , , E v i d e n t j g ^ eV^C<LvO ^ ^ ^ ^ \ L £ v ~ 
Person who performed the search ^ p ^ .vUrtV 
CHEMICAL TE§TS: 
(^ Mr. or Mrs. j / X : X T T t \ , - , do you understand that you are under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) "T \ ; ^ V I ^ X S ' T S ^ > ' 
I hereby request that you submit t$La chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) Cbntent of your blood. I 
request that you take a V ^ C ^ i S - * ^ test. \ / 0 x j (.c—- x ^ * 
(blood-breath-urine) 
E ' The following admonition was given by me to the si it: ject before the chemical test was adminis-
tered: 
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence of a blood 
alcohol content or presence*of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vehicle may, 
resJIt in suspension or revocation of your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response: 
> 4 ^ __ 
Did subject submit to a chemicaJ test? X ^ ^ a . Type of test \ p £ \ ^ ^ 
Test Administered by ^ M ^ L > r ^ \ , (< , \ t ^~AK Where? X S D - 0 
Time: J _ _ A _ _ Results_____z _Was subject notified of results? V r ^ 
Serial No. of test machine: I \*CX-> V \ M O 
(if the subject refuses the test, read the following) 
The following admonition-was given by me to the subject 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, h6w5vef4jrujst warn you that if you refuse, your license or 
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year vvitfua^provision for a limited driver's license. 
After you have taken this test, you will be permitted to have a physicTarho£^°ur own choice administer 
a test at your own expense, in addition to the one I have requested you to suBTmUo, so long as it does 
ADDENDUM B 
JURY INSTRUCTION; DEFENSE OF JUSTIFICATION 
INSTRUCTION NO, 
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for 
any offei ise based on the conduct. 
Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a 
harm or evil to himself c~ * J another is justifiable, provided that 
the hacni ML" ,:vil ••-••'•jht • avoided by such conduct is greater 
than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense 
charged, 
Ti^:,-. defend. *~ ves t- o your satisfaction 
that the above elements of justification did exist, and the 
prosecution does not negate the defense of oflmpulsi-on beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it sha 11 fae your dut ,.y to return a vei:di ct of not 
guilty. 
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